HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES (11 U.S.C. § 523)


LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS

 

 

Section 523(a)(1) represents a compromise between the position taken in the House bill and the Senate amendment. Section
523(a)(2) likewise represents a compromise between the position taken in the House bill and the Senate amendment with respect to the false financial statement exception to discharge. In order to clarify that a "renewal of credit" includes a "refinancing of credit", explicit reference to a refinancing of credit is made in the preamble to section 523(a)(2). A renewal of credit or refinancing of credit that was obtained by a false financial statement within the terms of section 523(a)(2) is nondischargeable. However, each of the provisions of section 523(a)(2) must be proved. Thus, under section 523(a)(2)(A) a creditor must prove that the debt was obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.

 

Subparagraph (A) is intended to codify current case law e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1887) (24 L. Ed. 586), which interprets "fraud" to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law. Subparagraph (A) is mutually exclusive from subparagraph (B). Subparagraph (B) pertains to the so-called false financial statement. In order for the debt to be nondischargeable, the creditor must prove that the debt was obtained by the use of a statement in writing (i) that is materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; (iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; (iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.

 

Section 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) is not intended to change from present law since the statement that the debtor causes to be made or published with the intent to deceive automatically includes a statement that the debtor actually makes or publishes with an intent to deceive.

 

Section 523(a)(2)(B) is explained in the House report. Under section 523(a)(2)(B)(i) a discharge is barred only as to that portion of a loan with respect to which a false financial statement is materially false.

In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to refinance existing credit on which there has been no default. If the creditor does not forfeit remedies or otherwise rely to his detriment on a false financial statement with respect to existing credit, then an extension, renewal, or refinancing of such credit is nondischargeable only to the extent of the new money advanced; on the other hand, if an existing loan is in default or the creditor otherwise reasonably relies to his detriment on a false financial statement with regard to an existing loan, then the entire debt is nondischargeable under section
523(a)(2)(B). This codifies the reasoning expressed by the second circuit in In re Danns, 558 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1977).

 

Section 523(a)(3) of the House amendment is derived from the Senate amendment. The provision is intended to overrule Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S. 345 (1904) (25 S.Ct. 38, 49 L.Ed. 231, 12 Am.Bankr.Rep. 691).

 

Section 523(a)(4) of the House amendment represents a compromise between the House bill and the Senate amendment.

 

Section 523(a)(5) is a compromise between the House bill and the Senate amendment. The provision excepts from discharge a debt owed to a spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child but not to the extent that the debt is assigned to another entity. If the debtor has assumed an obligation of the debtor's spouse to a third party in connection with a separation agreement, property settlement agreement, or divorce proceeding, such debt is dischargeable to the extent that payment of the debt by the debtor is not actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of debtor's spouse, former spouse, or child.

 

Section 523(a)(6) adopts the position taken in the House bill and rejects the alternative suggested in the Senate amendment. The phrase "willful and malicious injury" covers a willful and malicious conversion.

 

Section 523(a)(7) of the House amendment adopts the position taken in the Senate amendment and rejects the position taken in the House bill. A penalty relating to a tax cannot be nondischargeable unless the tax itself is nondischargeable.

 

Section 523(a)(8) represents a compromise between the House bill and the Senate amendment regarding educational loans. This provision is broader than current law which is limited to federally insured loans. Only educational loans owing to a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education are made nondischargeable under this paragraph.

 

Section 523(b) is new. The section represents a modification of similar provisions contained in the House bill and the Senate amendment.

 

Section 523(c) of the House amendment adopts the position taken in the Senate amendment.

 

Section 523(d) represents a compromise between the position taken in the House bill and the Senate amendment on the issue of attorneys' fees in false financial statement complaints to determine dischargeability. The provision contained in the House bill permitting the court to award damages is eliminated. The court must grant the debtor judgment or a reasonable attorneys' fee unless the granting of judgment would be clearly inequitable.

 

 

Nondischargeable debts: The House amendment retains the basic categories of nondischargeable tax liabilities contained in both bills, but restricts the time limits on certain nondischargeable taxes. Under the amendment, nondischargeable taxes cover taxes entitled to priority under section 507(a)(6) of title 11 and, in the case of individual debtors under chapters 7, 11, or 13, tax liabilities with respect to which no required return had been filed or as to which a late return had been filed if the return became last due, including extensions, within 2 years before the date of the petition or became due after the petition or as to which the debtor made a fraudulent return, entry or invoice or fraudulently attempted to evade or defeat the tax.

In the case of individuals in liquidation under chapter 7 or in reorganization under chapter 11 of title 11, section 1141(d)(2) incorporates by reference the exceptions to discharge continued in section 523. Different rules concerning the discharge of taxes where a partnership or corporation reorganizes under chapter 11, apply under section 1141.

 

The House amendment also deletes the reduction rule contained in section 523(e) of the Senate amendment. Under that rule, the amount of an otherwise nondischargeable tax liability would be reduced by the amount which a governmental tax authority could have collected from the debtor's estate if it had filed a timely claim against the estate but which it did not collect because no such claim was filed. This provision is deleted in order not to effectively compel a tax authority to file claim against the estate in "no asset" cases, along with a dischargeability petition. In no-asset cases, therefore, if the tax authority is not potentially penalized by failing to file a claim, the debtor in such cases will have a better opportunity to choose the prepayment forum, bankruptcy court or the Tax Court, in which to litigate his personal liability for a nondischargeable tax.

The House amendment also adopts the Senate amendment provision limiting the nondischargeability of punitive tax penalties, that is, penalties other than those which represent collection of a principal amount of tax liability through the form of a "penalty." Under the House amendment, tax penalties which are basically punitive in nature are to be nondischargeable only if the penalty is computed by reference to a related tax liability which is nondischargeable or, if the amount of the penalty is not computed by reference to a tax liability, the transaction or event giving rise to the penalty occurred during the 3-year period ending on the date of the petition.

 

LEGISLATIVE REPORTS

2005 Acts (Pub. L. 109-8). House Report No. 109-31.

2002 Acts (Pub. L. 107-204). House Conference Report No. 107-610.

1998 Acts (Pub. L. 105-244). House Conference Report No. 105-750

1996 Acts.

Aug. 22, 1996(104-193). House Report No. 104-651 and House Conference Report No. 104- 725.

Apr. 26, 1996 (104-134).  House Report No. 04-537.

1994 Acts.

Sept. 13, 1994 (Pub. L. 103-322). House Report Nos. 103-324 and 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-711.

October 22, 1994 (Pub. L. 103-394). House Report No. 103-835.

1990 Acts.

Nov. 29, 1990 (Pub. L. 101-647). House Report No. 101-681(Part I).

Nov. 15, 1990 (Pub. L. 101-581). Senate Report No. 101-434.

1986 Acts (Pub. L. 99-554). House Report No. 99-764 and House Conference Report No. 99-958.

1981 Acts. Senate Report No. 97-139 and House Conference Report No. 97- 208.

1979 Acts. Senate Report No. 96-230.

 

 

 

1978 Acts (Pub. L. 95-598).

 

 

Senate Report No. 95-989. This section specifies which of the debtor's debts are not discharged in a bankruptcy case, and certain procedures for effectuating the section. The provision in Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17c (section 35(c) of former title 11) granting the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to determine dischargeability is deleted as unnecessary, in view of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in proposed 28 U.S.C. 1334(b), which is adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17c. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will specify, as they do today, who may request determinations of dischargeability, subject, of course, to proposed 11 U.S.C. 523(c), and when such a request may be made. Proposed 11 U.S.C. 350, providing for reopening of cases, provides one possible procedure for a determination of dischargeability and related issues after a case is closed.

 

Subsection (a) lists nine kinds of debts excepted from discharge. Taxes that are excepted from discharge are set forth in paragraph (1). These include claims against the debtor which receive priority in the second, third and sixth categories (Sec. 507(a)(3)(B) and (c) and (6)). These categories include taxes for which the tax authority failed to file a claim against the estate or filed its claim late. Whether or not the taxing authority's claim is secured will also not affect the claim's nondischargeability if the tax liability in question is otherwise entitled to priority.

 

Also included in the nondischargeable debts are taxes for which the debtor had not filed a required return as of the petition date, or for which a return had been filed beyond its last permitted due date (Sec. 523(a)(1)(B)). For this purpose, the date of the tax year to which the return relates is immaterial. The late return rule applies, however, only to the late returns filed within three years before the petition was filed, and to late returns filed after the petition in title 11 was filed. For this purpose, the taxable year in question need not be one or more of the three years immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

 

Tax claims with respect to which the debtor filed a fraudulent return, entry or invoice, or fraudulently attempted to evade or defeat any tax (Sec. 523(a)(1)(C)) are included. The date of the taxable year with regard to which the fraud occurred is immaterial.

Also included are tax payments due under an agreement for deferred payment of taxes, which a debtor had entered into with the Internal Revenue Service (or State or local tax authority) before the filing of the petition and which relate to a prepetition tax liability (Sec. 523(a)(1)(D)) are also nondischargeable. This classification applies only to tax claims which would have received priority under section 507(a) if the taxpayer had filed a title 11 petition on the date on which the deferred payment agreement was entered into. This rule also applies only to installment payments which become due during and after the commencement of the title 11 case. Payments which had become due within one year before the filing of the petition receive sixth priority, and will be nondischargeable under the general rule of section 523(a)(1)(A).

The above categories of nondischargeability apply to customs duties as well as to taxes.

 

Paragraph (2) provides that as under Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17a(2) (section 35(a)(2) of former title 11), a debt for obtaining money, property, services, or a refinancing extension or renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, or by use of a statement in writing respecting the debtor's financial condition that is materially false, on which the creditor reasonably relied, and which the debtor made or published with intent to deceive, is excepted from discharge. This provision is modified only slightly from current section 17a(2). First, "actual fraud" is added as a ground for exception from discharge. Second, the creditor must not only have relied on a false statement in writing, but the reliance must have been reasonable. This codifies case law construing present section 17a(2). Third, the phrase "in any manner whatsoever" that appears in current law after "made or published" is deleted as unnecessary, the word "published" is used in the same sense that it is used in defamation cases.

 

Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under paragraph (3). The provision, derived from section 17a(3) (section 35(a)(3) of former title 11), follows current law, but clarifies some uncertainties generated by the case law construing 17a(3). The debt is excepted from discharge if it was not scheduled in time to permit timely action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case.

 

Paragraph (4) excepts debts for fraud incurred by the debtor while acting in a fiduciary capacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation.

 

Paragraph (5) provides that debts for willful and malicious conversion or injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity are nondischargeable. Under this paragraph "willful" means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473 (1902), held that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard" standard, they are overruled.

 

Paragraph (6) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of the spouse or child. This language, in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 656(b)) by section 326 of the bill, will apply to make nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent. What constitute s alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy law, not State law. Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974), are overruled, and the result in cases such as Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1952) is followed. The proviso, however, makes nondischargeable any debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerations as to whether a particular agreement to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.

 

Paragraph (7) makes nondischargeable certain liabilities for penalties including tax penalties if the underlying tax with respect to which the penalty was imposed is also nondischargeable (sec. 523(a)(7)). These latter liabilities cover those which, but are penal in nature, as distinct from so-called "pecuniary loss" penalties which, in the case of taxes, involve basically the collection of a tax under the label of a "penalty." This provision differs from the bill as introduced, which did not link the nondischarge of a tax penalty with the treatment of the underlying tax. The amended provision reflects the existing position of the Internal Revenue Service as to tax penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (Rev.Rul. 68-574, 1968-2 C.B. 595).

 

Paragraph (8) follows generally current law and excerpts from discharge student loans until such loans have been due and owing for five years. Such loans include direct student loans as well as insured and guaranteed loans. This provision is intended to be self-executing and the lender or institution is not required to file a complaint to determine the nondischargeability of any student loan.

 

Paragraph (9) excepts from discharge debts that the debtor owed before a previous bankruptcy case concerning the debtor in which the debtor was denied a discharge other than on the basis of the six-year bar.

 

Subsection (b) of this section permits discharge in a bankruptcy case of an unscheduled debt from a prior case. This provision is carried over from Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17b (section 35(b) of former title 11). The result dictated by the subsection would probably not be different if the subsection were not included. It is included nevertheless for clarity.

 

Subsection (c) requires a creditor who is owed a debt that may be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (5), (false statements, defalcavtion or larceny misappropriation, or willful and malicious injury) to initiate proceedings in the bankruptcy court for an exception to discharge. If the creditor does not act, the debt is discharged. This provision does not change current law.

 

Subsection (d) is new. It provides protection to a consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on the ground of falsity in the incurring of the debt. The debtor may be awarded costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt under subsection (a)(2), if the court finds that the proceeding was frivolous or not brought by its creditor in good faith.

The purpose of the provision is to discourage creditors from initiating proceedings to obtaining a false financial statement exception to discharge in the hope of obtaining a settlement from an honest debtor anxious to save attorney's fees. Such practices impair the debtor's fresh start and are contrary to the spirit of the bankruptcy laws.

 

House Report No. 95-595. Subsection (a) lists eight kinds of debts excepted from discharge. Taxes that are entitled to priority are excepted from discharge under paragraph (1). In addition , taxes with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat, or with respect to which a return (if required) was not filed or was not filed after the due date and after one year before the bankruptcy case are excepted from discharge. If the taxing authority's claim has been disallowed, then it would be barred by the more modern rules of collateral estoppel from reasserting that claim against the debtor after the case was closed. See Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws: Tax Procedures, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1360, 1388 (1975).

 

As under Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17a(2) (section 35(a)(2) of former title 11), debt for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension or renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, or by use of a statement in writing respecting the debtor's financial condition that is materially false, on which the creditor reasonably relied, and that the debtor made or published with intent to deceive, is excepted from discharge. This provision is modified only slightly from current section 17a(2). First, "actual fraud" is added as a grounds for exception from discharge. Second, the creditor must not only have relied on a false statement in writing, the reliance must have been reasonable. This codifies case law construing this provision. Third, the phrase "in any manner whatsoever" that appears in current law after "made or published" is deleted as unnecessary. The word "published" is used in the same sense that it is used in slander actions.

 

Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under paragraph (3). The provision, derived from section 17a(3) (section 35(a)(3) of former title 11), follows current law, but clarifies some uncertainties generated by the case law construing 17a(3). The debt is excepted from discharge if it was not scheduled in time to permit timely action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case.

 

Paragraph (4) excepts debts for embezzlement or larceny. The deletion of willful and malicious conversion from Sec. 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act (section 35(a)(2) of former title 11) is not intended to effect a substantive change. The intent is to include in the category of non-dischargeable debts a conversion under which the debtor willfully and maliciously intends to borrow property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict injury but on which injury is in fact inflicted.

 

Paragraph (5) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or child. This language, in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 656(b)) by section 327 of the bill, will apply to make nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or dependent. See Hearings, pt. 2, at 942.

What constitute s alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, not State law. Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974); Hearings, pt. 3, at 1308-10, are overruled, and the result in cases such as Fife v. Fife, 1 Utah 2d 281, 265 P.2d 642 (1952) is followed. This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 1287-1290.

 

Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, "willful" means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902) (24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard" standard, they are overruled.

 

Paragraph (7) excepts from discharge a debt for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, that is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.

 

Paragraph (8) (enacted as (9)) excepts from discharge debts that the debtor owed before a previous bankruptcy case concerning the debtor in which the debtor was denied a discharge other than on the basis of the six-year bar.

 

Subsection (d) is new. It provides protection to a consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on grounds of falsity in the incurring of the debt. The debtor is entitled to costs of and a reasonable attorney's fee for the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt under subsection (a)(2), if the creditor initiated the proceeding and the debt was determined to be dischargeable. The court is permitted to award any actual pecuniary loss that the debtor may have suffered as a result of the proceeding (such as loss of a day's pay). The purpose of the provision is to discourage creditors from initiating false financial statement exception to discharge actions in the hopes of obtaining a settlement from an honest debtor anxious to save attorney's fees.  Such practices impair the debtor's fresh start.

 

AMENDMENTS

 

 

2010

Subsec. (a)(2)(C)(ii)(II). Pub. L. 111-327 (12/22/10), § 2(a)(18)(A), substituted semicolon for period at end.

Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 111-327 (12/22/10), § 2(a)(18)(B), substituted “521(a)(1)” for “521(1)” in introductory provisions.

2005

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109-8, § 714(2), inserted at end “For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘return’ means a return that satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements). Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law.”

Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109-8, § 1502(a)(2), substituted “507(a)(3)” for “507(a)(2)”.

Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 109-8, § 714(1)(A), inserted “or equivalent report or notice,” after “a return,” in introductory provisions.

Subsec. (a)(1)(B)(i). Pub. L. 109-8, § 714(1)(B), inserted “or given” after “filed”.

Subsec. (a)(1)(B)(ii). Pub. L. 109-8, § 714(1)(C), inserted “or given” after “filed” and “, report, or notice” after “return”.

Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 109-8, § 310, amended subpar. (C) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (C) read as follows: “for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for ‘luxury goods or services’ incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; ‘luxury goods or services’ do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act;”.

Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 109-8, § 215(1)(A), added par. (5) and struck out former par. (5) which read as follows: “to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that—

“(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or

“(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;”

Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 109-8, § 220, added par. (8) and struck out former par. (8) which read as follows: “for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents;”.

Subsec. (a)(9). Pub. L. 109-8, § 1209(2), substituted “motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft” for “motor vehicle”.

Subsec. (a)(14A). Pub. L. 109-8, § 314(a), added par. (14A).

Subsec. (a)(14B). Pub. L. 109-8, § 1235, added par. (14B).

Subsec. (a)(15).

Pub. L. 109-8, § 1209(1), transferred par. (15) and inserted it after subsec. (a)(14A). See 1994 Amendments note below.

Pub. L. 109-8, § 215(3), in par. (15), inserted “to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and” before “not of the kind” and “or” after “court of record,” and substituted a semicolon for “unless—

“(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business; or

“(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor;”.

Subsec. (a)(16). Pub. L. 109-8, § 412, struck out “dwelling” after “debtor’s interest in a” and “housing” after “share of a cooperative” and substituted “ownership,” for “ownership or” and “or a lot in a homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in such unit, such corporation, or such lot,” for “but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period during which—

“(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the condominium or cooperative project; or

“(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and received payments from the tenant for such period,”.

Subsec. (a)(17). Pub. L. 109-8, § 301, substituted “on a prisoner by any court” for “by a court” and “subsection (b) or (f)(2) of section 1915” for “section 1915 (b) or (f)” and inserted “(or a similar non-Federal law)” after “title 28” in two places.

Subsec. (a)(18). Pub. L. 109-8, § 224(c), added par. (18).

Pub. L. 109-8, § 215(1)(B), struck out par. (18) which read as follows: “owed under State law to a State or municipality that is—

“(A) in the nature of support, and

“(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.); or”.

Subsec. (a)(19)(B). Pub. L. 109-8, § 1404(a), inserted “, before, on, or after the date on which the petition was filed,” after “results” in introductory provisions.

Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 109-8, § 215(2), substituted “or (6)” for “(6), or (15)” in two places.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109-8, § 1209(3), substituted “an insured” for “a insured”.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2002—Subsec. (a)(19). Pub. L. 107-204 added par. (19).

 

 

1998—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 105-244 substituted "stipend, unless" for "stipend, unless — " and struck out "(B)" before "excepting such debt" and subpar. (A) which read as follows: "such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition; or".

 

 

1996

 

 

Subsec. (a)(5)(A). Pub. L. 104-193, Sec. 374(a)(4), substituted "section 408(a)(3)" for "section 402(a)(26)".

 

Subsec. (a)(17). Pub. L. 104-134 added par. (17).

 

 

Subsec. (a)(18). Pub. L. 104-193, Sec. 374(a)(1)-(3), added par. (18).

 

 

1994

 

 

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 501(d)(13)(A)(i), substituted "1141," for "1141,," in introductory provisions.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 304(h)(3), substituted "507(a)(8)" for "507(a)(7)".

 

Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 306, 501(d)(13)(A)(ii), substituted "$1,000 for" for "$500 for", "60" for "forty" after "incurred by an individual debtor on or within", and "60" for "twenty" after "obtained by an individual debtor on or within", and struck out "(15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)" after "Protection Act".

 

 

Subsec. (a)(11). Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320934(1), struck out "or" after semicolon at end.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(12). Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320934(2), which directed the substitution of "; or" for a period at end of par. (12), could not be executed because a period did not appear at end.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(13). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 221(1), substituted semicolon for period at end.

Pub. L. 103-322, Sec. 320934(3), added par. (13).

 

Subsec. (a)(14). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 221(2), added par. (14).

 

 

Subsec. (a)(15). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 304(e)((1)), which directed the amendment of this section by adding par. (15) "at the end" was executed by adding par. (15) at the end of subsec. (a) to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(16). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 309, added par. (16).

 

 

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 501(d)(13)(B), struck out "(20 U.S.C. 1087-3)" after "Act of 1965" and "(42 U.S.C. 294f)" after "Service Act".

 

Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 304(e)(2), substituted "(6), or (15)" for "or (6)" in two places.

 

 

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 501(d)(13)(C), substituted "insured depository institution" for "depository institution or insured credit union".

 

 

1990

 

 

Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 3621, substituted "for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless" for "for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless" in introductory provisions and amended subpar. (A) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (A) read as follows: "such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition; or".

 

Subsec. (a)(9). Pub. L. 101-581 and Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 3102(a), identically amended par. (9) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (9) read as follows: "to any entity, to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within the United States or its territories wherein such motor vehicle was operated and within which such liability was incurred; or".

 

 

Subsec. (a)(11), (12). Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 2522(a)(1), added pars. (11) and (12).

 

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 2522(a)(3), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).

 

 

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-647, Sec. 2522(a)(2), added subsec. (e).

 

 

1986

 

 

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 257(n), inserted reference to sections 1228(a) and 1228(b) of this title.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(j)(1)(A), substituted "507(a)(7)" for "507(a)(6)".

 

Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 281, struck out the comma after "decree" and inserted ", determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit," after "record".

 

 

Subsec. (a)(9), (10). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(j)(1)(B), redesignated par. (9) relating to debts incurred by persons driving while intoxicated, added by Pub. L. 98-353, as (10).

 

 

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(j)(2), substituted "Service" for "Services".

 

 

1984

 

 

Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 454(a)(1), in provisions preceding subpar. (A), struck out "obtaining" after "for", and substituted "refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained" for "refinance of credit,".

 

Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 307(a)(1), struck out "or" at end.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 307(a)(2), inserted "or" at end.

 

 

Subsec. (a)(2)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 454(a)(1)(A), struck out "obtaining" before "such".

 

 

Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 307(a)(3), added subpar. (C).

 

Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 454(b)(1), inserted "or other order of a court of record" after "divorce decree," in provisions preceding subpar. (A).

 

 

Subsec. (a)(5)(A). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 454(b)(2), inserted ", or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State".

 

 

Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 371(1), 454(a)(2), struck out "of higher education" after "a nonprofit institution of" and struck out "or" at end.

 

Subsec. (a)(9). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 371(2), added the par. (9) relating to debts incurred by persons driving while intoxicated.

 

 

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 454(c), inserted "of a kind" after "debt".

 

 

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 307(b), substituted "the court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially justified, except that the court shall not award such costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award unjust" for "the court shall grant judgment against such creditor and in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding to determine dischargeability, unless such granting of judgment would be clearly inequitable".

 

1981—Subsec. (a)(5)(A). Pub. L. 97-35 substituted "law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act);" for "law, or otherwise;".

 

 

1979—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 96-56 substituted "for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education" for "to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educational loan" in the provisions preceding subpar. (A) and inserted "(exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period)" after "before five years" in subpar. (A).

 

 

EFFECTIVE DATES

2005 Acts. Pub. L. 109-8, Title XV, § 1501, Apr. 20, 2005, provided that, except as otherwise specifically provided, all amendments, except for amendments provided in Pub. L. 109-8, Title III, §§ 308, 322, and 330, are effective 180 days after enactment of the Act on April 20, 2005 (which occurs on October 17, 2005), and are inapplicable with respect to cases commenced under Title 11 before the effective date.

Pub. L. 109-8, Title XIV, § 1404, provided that the amendments made to section 523(a)(19((B) (debts relating to violations of any of the Federal securities laws) are effective beginning July 30, 2002.

1998 Amendments. Pub. L. 105-244, title IX, Sec. 971(b), Oct. 7, 1998, 112 Stat. 1837, provided that: "The amendment made by subsection (a) (amending this section) shall apply only with respect to cases commenced under title 11, United States Code, after the date of enactment of this Act (Oct. 7, 1998)."

1996 Amendments. Section 374(c) of Pub. L. 104-193 provided that: "The amendments made by this section (amending this section and section 656 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare) shall apply only with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code after the date of the enactment of this Act (Aug. 22, 1996)." For provisions relating to effective date of title III of Pub. L. 104-193, see section 395(a)-(c) of Pub. L. 104-193, set out as a note under section 654 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

1994 Acts. Amendment by Pub. L. 103-394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Pub. L. 103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.

1990 Amendments. Section 3104 of title XXXI of Pub. L. 101-647 provided that:

"(a) Effective Date.—This title and the amendments made by this title (amending this section and section 1328 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 101 of this title) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act (Nov. 29, 1990).

"(b) Application of Amendments.—The amendments made by this title (amending this section and section 1328 of this title) shall not apply with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code before the date of the enactment of this Act." Amendment by section 3621 of Pub. L. 101-647 effective 180 days after Nov. 29, 1990, see section 3631 of Pub. L. 101-647, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3001 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Section 4 of Pub. L. 101-581 provided that:

"(a) Effective Date.—This Act and the amendments made by this Act (amending this section and section 1328 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 101 of this title) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act (Nov. 15, 1990).

"(b) Application of Amendments.—The amendments made by this Act (amending this section and section 1328 of this title) shall not apply with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code before the date of the enactment of this Act."

1986 Amendments. Amendment by section 257 of Pub. L. 99-554 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1986, but not applicable to cases commenced under this title before that date, see section 302(a),
(c)(1) of Pub. L. 99-554, set out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Amendment by sections 281 and 283 of Pub. L. 99-554 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1986, see section 302(a) of Pub. L. 99-554.

1984 Amendments. Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.

1981 Amendments. Amendment by Pub. L. 97-35 effective Aug. 13, 1981, see section 2334(c) of Pub. L. 97-35, set out as a note under section 656 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

ADJUSTMENT OF DOLLAR AMOUNTS

For adjustment of dollar amounts specified in subsec. (a)(2)(C) of this section by the Judicial Conference of the United States, effective Apr. 1, 2001, see note set out under section 104 of this title.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Consumer Credit Protection Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(C), is Pub. L. 90-321, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, which is classified principally to chapter 41 (Sec. 1601 et seq.) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of Title 15 and Tables.

The Bankruptcy Act, referred to in subsecs. (a)(10) and (b), is act July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, which was classified generally to former Title 11. Sections 14c and 17a of the Bankruptcy Act were classified to sections 32(c) and 35(a) of former Title 11.

The Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(18)(B), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended . Part D of title IV of the Act is classified generally to part D (Sec. 651 et seq.) of subchapter IV of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. Section 408(a)(3) of the Act is classified to section 608(a)(3) of Title 42. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.

Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in subsec. (a)(19)(A)(i), is classified to section 78c(a)(47) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

Section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (b), was classified to section 1087-3 of Title 20, Education, and was repealed by Pub. L. 95-598, title III, Sec. 317, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2678.

Section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act, referred to in subsec. (b), was repealed by Pub. L. 95-598, title III, Sec. 327, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2679. A subsec. (g), containing similar provisions, was added to section 733 by Pub. L. 97-35, title XXVII, Sec. 2730, Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 919. Section 733 was subsequently omitted in the general revision of subchapter V of chapter 6A of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, by Pub. L. 102-408, title I, Sec. 102, Oct. 13, 1992, 106 Stat. 1994. See section 292f(g) of Title 42.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 101, 104, 106, 502, 507, 522, 524, 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 of this title; title 20 section 1087; title 26 sections 6327, 7437.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


FOOTNOTES (11 U.S.C. § 523)

15 U.S.C. § 1602    •   

 

 


29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) provides as follows:

 § 1108. Exemptions from prohibited transactions

(b) Enumeration of transactions exempted from section 1106 prohibitions. The prohibitions provided in section 1106 of this title shall not apply to any of the following transactions:

(1) Any loans made by the plan to parties in interest who are participants or beneficiaries of the plan if such loans (A) are available to all such participants and beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis, (B) are not made available to highly compensated employees (within the meaning of section 414(q) of Title 26) in an amount greater than the amount made available to other employees, (C) are made in accordance with specific provisions regarding such loans set forth in the plan, (D) bear a reasonable rate of interest, and (E) are adequately secured. A loan made by a plan shall not fail to meet the requirements of the preceding sentence by reason of a loan repayment suspension described under section 414(u)(4) of Title 26.

 


5 U.S.C. §§ 8431 - 8440f    •   


5 U.S.C. § 8433(g)    •   

 

 


15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) provides as follows:

(47) The term "securities laws" means the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a et seq.) [15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq.], the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) [15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.], and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.).

 


Dollar adjustment made pursuant to BC § 104(a), effective April 1, 2016.  See, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 34, p. 8748-8749 (2/22/16).    •    523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)   -  523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II)


Pub. L. 111-327 (12/22/10)(Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010), § 2(a)(18)(A), substituted semicolon for period at end.    •   


Pub. L. 111-327 (12/22/10)(Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010), § 2(a)(18)(B), substituted “521(a)(1)” for “521(1)” in introductory provisions.    •   

 

 


BAPCPA & LEGISLATIVE REPORT LINKS (11 U.S.C. § 523)

BAPCPA § 215(1)(A)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 215(1)(B)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 215(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 215(3)(A)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 215(3)(B)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 215(3)(C)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 220    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 224(c)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 301(1)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 301(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 301(3)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 310    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 314(a)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 412(1)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 412(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 412(3)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 412(4)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 714(1)(A)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 714(1)(B)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 714(1)(C)(i)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 714(1)(C)(ii)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 714(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 1209(1) (inserted par. (a)(15) after par. (a)(14A))    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 1209(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 1209(3)    •    House Report 109-31    •   


BAPCPA § 1235    •    House Report 109-31    •   

 

 


BAPCPA § 1404(a)    •    House Report 109-31    •    BAPCPA § 1404(a) contains the following uncodified provisions:

(b) Effective Date Upon Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The amendment made by subsection (a) is effective beginning July 30, 2002.

 


BAPCPA § 1502(a)(2)    •    House Report 109-31    •   

 

 


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